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Abstract: This paper examines whether a reductionist 
view of the self can be found in the Suttas of early Bud-
dhism. I will argue that the views of the self exemplified 
in the Path of Purification (Visuddhimagga) and the Ab-
hidhamma Commentaries are similar to reductionist 
views of the self put forward by Western philosophers 
such as David Hume and Derek Parfit. I shall argue that 
the views of the Visuddhimagga can be seen as a legiti-
mate development of the ideas of the Suttas. I will also 
argue however that an opposing view, namely the rejec-
tion of a 'realist semantics', can be found in nascent form 
in the Suttas. I will demonstrate that, when legitimately 
developed, this view can be seen to contradict the reduc-
tionist view of the self.  
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Reductionism in regards to the self is the view that all 
facts about a person can be reduced to a set of more par-
ticular impersonal facts (Parfit, 1984 p. 210). In Western 
philosophy these impersonal facts may be facts about the 
operation of the brain and body. In Buddhism, in particu-
lar the Buddhism of the Abhidhamma Commentaries of 
Buddhaghosa, these facts are the operation of the five ag-
gregates (khandhas). On this view a 'person' or 'self' is 
merely a convenient label for this set of deeper facts and a 
comprehensive account of ultimate reality could be given 
without reference to 'persons' or 'selves' at all. In this pa-
per I will take the reductionism of Derek Parfit as a stan-
dard for what a reductionist position looks like. I will then 
attempt to address a number of sub-questions before re-
turning to the overarching question of whether the Bud-
dha held a similar reductionist view of the self. I will first 
outline the standard account of the Buddhist No-Self 
(anattā) doctrine as enumerated by Buddhaghosa and 
show how this is similar to Western reductionist views of 
the self such as that of Derek Parfit. In section two I will 
discuss the objection that the Buddha was not a philoso-
pher at all but rather was a pragmatist attempting to make 
a soteriological point by teaching anattā. I shall argue that 
this view is mistaken and that the Suttas display clear evi-
dence of systematic philosophy. I shall then explore, in 
section three what some scholars, notably Ronkin, (2005) 
have taken to be the Buddha's view of language, through a 
close analysis of the Madhupiṇḍika Sutta. I will show 
how in this Sutta seeds of the notion that language is a 
mere convention are present, I shall argue along with 
Ronkin (2005) that this rejection of a 'realist semantics' 
has analogues in the Madhyamaka of Nāgārjuna. I shall 
take the position of Parfit as a benchmark for what a re-
ductionist position looks like and shall argue that the posi-
tion of Nāgārjuna is ultimately different in content -- the 
differences hinging on divergent accounts of language, 
truth and reality. In the final section I shall fully expound 
the view of the self found in the Abhidhamma Commen-
taries. I shall show how the seeds of this view can be 
found in the Suttas, particularly the Vajirā Sutta and I 
shall show how the view of the self here is closely analo-
gous to the reductionism of Parfit. I will conclude by ar-
guing that both the 'reductionist realist' position of 
Buddhaghosa and the 'semantic anti-realism' of Nāgārjuna 
are supported in the early tradition and that, depending on 
the text analysed, it is possible to conclude that the Bud-
dha both was and was not a reductionist about the self.  
 
 
1. The Standard View 
 
The standard understanding of the Buddha's teaching of 
No-Self (anattā) as enumerated by Buddhaghosa is as fol-
lows: in the Anattalakkhaṇa Sutta (PTS: S iii 66) the 
Buddha explains that there are five aggregates (khandhas) 
which make up a human being: matter or form (rūpa), 
feeling (vedanā), apperception / conceptualisation 
(saññā), volition (saṅkhāra) and consciousness (viññāṇa). 
The Buddha asserts that these aggregates are not fit to be 
regarded as Self (attā), this is because, ultimately one 
cannot absolutely control them, one cannot say 'let my 
material body be this way!' or 'let me feel this way!' and 
because they are impermanent (anicca) and lead to suffer-
ing (dukkha).  
In brahminical thought it was believed that one could 
attain universal power through the realisation that the 
microcosm of the true Self (skt. ātman, Pāli: attā) and the 
macrocosm of the universe (brahman) were identical. 
Control over the Self would lead to control over the uni-
verse with which it is identical (Collins, 1982 p.97). The 
Buddha, taking aim at this philosophy argues in the 
Anattalakkhaṇa Sutta that there is no 'inner controller' and 
that one ultimately does not have control over the con-
stituents of the self. One cannot say 'let my body be thus', 
'let me feel thus' rather there are aspects of the body and 
the self that are beyond conscious control. The two other 
prongs of the Buddha's argument in the Anattalakkhaṇa 
Sutta are directed against the Upaniṣadic notion of brah-
man as 'being', 'consciousness', and 'bliss' (satcitānanda). 
The Buddha argues that there is no element of the self that 
is permanently existent and blissful and that all five of the 
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khandhas, including consciousness (viññāṇa) are imper-
manent (anicca) and tend towards suffering (dukkha). In 
doing so the Buddha rejects Upaniṣadic concepts of being 
and the corresponding notions of ātman and brahman. In-
deed the three hallmarks of existence (ti-lakkhaṇa), im-
permanence (anicca), suffering (dukkha) and Not-Self 
(anattā) betray Upaniṣadic reasoning in that they are in 
direct opposition to the triad of satcitānanda (Gombrich, 
2009 pp. 69-70). 
On this standard view of the No-Self doctrine, exem-
plified in the teachings of Buddhaghosa the five khandhas 
are seen as constituting an exhaustive list of the series of 
processes which we conventionally designate by the term 
'person': 'it is only these that can afford a basis for the 
figment of a Self or of anything related to a Self' ( Visud-
dhimagga XIV. 218) (translation from Siderits 2007, p. 
37). Accordingly the Anattalakkhaṇa Sutta gives a philo-
sophical analysis of the five khandhas as an exhaustive 
list of the individual and asserts that within the individual 
no permanent, unchanging essence (attā) is to be found. 
According to the Abhidhamma the only ultimately ex-
isting phenomena are those which possess 'intrinsic na-
ture' (Sanskrit: svabhāva; Pāli: sabhāva). What is only 
conventionally real disappears under analysis but what is 
ultimately real cannot be broken down into further parts. 
To take a well known example a chariot is conventionally 
real, a conceptual fiction, because upon analysis one can 
see that a chariot is composed entirely of parts, such as 
the axle, the spokes, the ropes, the wheels etc. which in 
turn can be broken down into further parts. Parts which 
are elementary and cannot be further broken down are 
termed dhammas. This category includes a variety of non-
material (mental) dhammas and matter (rūpa) which can 
be further analysed in terms of the four primary elements 
(cattāri māha bhūtāni) of solidity (earth), adhesion 
(water), heat (fire) and motion (wind) (Mendis, 1985 p. 
23). Whilst this theory may resemble atomism it is im-
portant to note that a fire dhamma is merely a momentary 
occurrence of the property of heat not an atom. Likewise 
an earth dhamma is not a very small substance but rather 
an 'occurrence of solidity in a very small region of space' 
(Siderits 2007. p. 15). The Abhidhamma asserts that the 
person can be reduced to a bundle of dhammas: matter 
(rūpa), feeling (vedanā), apperception (saññā),volition 
(saṅkhāra) and consciousness (viññāṇa) and that the 'self' 
as a conceptual fiction borrows its existence from these 
five more basic elements. Take away the five khandhas 
and nothing of the 'self' remains. The person is therefore a 
collection of mental and physical dhammas which them-
selves are impermanent, causally conditioned and subject 
to dependent origination (paṭiccasamuppāda). According 
to the parlance of everyday language it is true that 'per-
sons' exist. We can refer to persons, predicate things of 
them and describe their actions. Nevertheless at the ulti-
mate level of reality, the level of the dhammas, it is the 
case that there are no persons and there is no attā. There 
are only the five khandhas. Persons are not 'in the lan-
guage of “ultimate” truth, ultimately real Existents' 
(Collins, 1997, p.478). Hence the statement of Buddhag-
hosa: 
 
'Just as when trunk, branches, foliage, etc., are placed in a cer-
tain way, there comes to be the mere term of common usage 
“tree,” yet in the ultimate sense, when each component is exam-
ined, there is no tree. ..so too, when there are the five aggregates 
[as objects] of clinging, there comes to be the mere term of 
common usage “a being,” “a person,” yet in the ultimate sense, 
when each component is examined, there is no being as a basis 
for the assumption “I am” or “I”' (Visuddhimagga, XVIII, 28) 
[Trans. Ñāṇamoli (2010)]. 
 
This view is a type of mereological reductionism (Siderits 
2007, p.54). This is the view that parts are real but wholes 
are not; wholes consist entirely in their parts and can be 
reduced to them. It is also a version of realism, as it as-
sumes that there are ultimately real phenomena (dham-
mas) that can be described using language. Just as we use 
the word 'chariot' to designate an assemblage of parts (to 
use an example from the Vajirā sutta), so too we use the 
term 'self' to designate the khandhas. A 'self' is ultimately 
unreal and all that exists is the psychophysical continuity 
of the khandhas. We use the word 'self' only as a conven-
tional shorthand for this deeper truth. 
This reductionist realist view of the self has been 
compared to the views of Western philosophers such as 
Derek Parfit and David Hume. Parfit argues that a 'person' 
just consists in the existence of a brain and body and the 
occurrence of certain mental and physical events and pro-
cesses such as thoughts, actions and experiences. To use 
an analogy a 'person' is rather like a 'nation'. A nation 
consists entirely in a body of people inhabiting a certain 
territory united by a common history, culture, or lan-
guage, and is nothing over and above this. Likewise, for 
Parfit, a person consists entirely in the mental processes 
of brain and body and is, ontologically, nothing extra 
(Parfit, 1984 pp. 199- 218). We conceive of persons (or 
'selves') as permanent entities above our thoughts and ex-
periences only because of language, which imposes a 
stable concept of 'person' upon multiple transient pro-
cesses. Hence: 
 
'Even Reductionists do not deny that people exist. And, on our 
concept of a person, people are not thoughts and acts. They are 
thinkers and agents. I am not a series of experiences, but the 
person who has these experiences. A Reductionist can admit 
that, in this sense, a person is what has experiences, or the sub-
ject of experiences. This is true because of the way in which we 
talk. What a Reductionist denies is that the subject of experi-
ences is a separately existing entity, distinct from a brain and 
body, and a series of physical and mental events' (Parfit, 1984 p. 
233). 
 
Parfit asserts that the Buddha would have agreed with this 
reductionist realist view of the self (Parfit, 1984 p. 273). 
Likewise Hume saw persons as a 'bundle' of different per-
ceptions with no enduring substance.  
 
'For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call my-
self, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of 
heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I 
never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and 
never can observe any thing but the perception.' (Treatise, 
1.4.6.3)  
 
As such both 'Hume and the Buddha were unable to find a 
self when they looked within' (Siderits, 2007, p.45).  
In the following sections I will examine a number of chal-




In the next section I will first address the question of 
whether or not the Buddha was a philosopher. I will argue 
against the view of Thanissaro (2011) that the anattā doc-
trine is a purely practical strategy and I will seek to dem-
onstrate that it is not misleading to characterise the Bud-
dha as a philosopher. 
 
 
2. Was the Buddha a Philosopher? 
 
As reductionism is a philosophical position it will be first 
necessary to establish whether the Buddha was interested 
in presenting a philosophically coherent doctrine in re-
gards to the self. There are a number of scholars who ar-
gue that he was not. Gombrich (2009, p. 60) argues that to 
compare the words of the Buddha to philosophers such as 
Hume is to remove them from their historical context and 
to potentially obscure them. For Gombrich the Buddha's 
approach to the problem of suffering (dukkha) and its ces-
sation (nirodha) is pragmatic. As a consequence the Bud-
dha was not interested in philosophical questions for their 
own sake (Gombrich, 2009 p. 67).  
Gombrich asserts that the Buddha 'condemned all 
theorising which had no practical value' and 'tended to be 
quite hard on those who indulged in metaphysical specu-
lations' (Gombrich, 2009 p. 166). Furthermore he 'was not 
interested in presenting a philosophically coherent doc-
trine' (Gombrich, 2009 p. 164) but was rather focussed on 
providing pragmatic advice which was nonetheless under-
pinned by systematic thought.  
Support for the view that the Buddha was not inter-
ested in purely philosophical speculation is to be found by 
considering the unanswered questions (abyākatā pañhā). 
As explained in the Cūḷamāluṅkyovada Sutta (PTS: M i 
426) the Buddha refused to comment on metaphysical 
questions such as: 
 
1.) Is the cosmos eternal? 
2.) Is the cosmos not eternal? 
3.) Is the cosmos finite? 
4.) Is the cosmos infinite? 
5.) Are the soul and the body the same? 
6.) Is the soul one thing and the body another? 
7.) Does the Tathāgata exist after death? 
8.) Does the Tathāgata not exist after death? 
9.) Does the Tathāgata both exist and does not exist after death? 
10.) Does the Tathāgata neither exist nor does not exist after 
death? 
 
These 'ten indeterminates' (dasa avyākatavattūni) 'formed 
a kind of questionnaire with which the ancient Indians 
used to confront any religious teacher of note' 
(Ñāṇananda, 1971 p. 17). The Buddha rejects the ques-
tionnaire in toto and advises that the questions are the 
outcome of wrong reflection and hence do not warrant a 
reply (Ñāṇananda, 1971 pp. 17- 18). The questions are 
unhelpful and are compared to a man shot with a pois-
oned arrow enquiring as to the name, height and town of 
origin of the man who shot him, instead of receiving the 
necessary treatment. Spending time in speculation, rather 
than attending to the immediate problem of dukkha is of 
no benefit and will not lead to nibbāna. A similar point is 
made in the Aggivacchagotta Sutta wherein the Buddha 
repudiates the same list of questions as 'a thicket of views' 
(PTS: M i 483. Trans: Bodhi [2009]).  
This view that the anattā doctrine is not philosophy is 
more radically taken up by Thanissaro Bhikkhu. Thanis-
saro (2011) states that 'the Buddha in teaching not-self 
was not answering the question of whether there is or isn't 
a self. This question was one he explicitly put aside' 
(Thanissaro, 2011 p. 1). Thanissaro argues that the Bud-
dha's teaching just covers two issues, how suffering is 
caused and the path to its cessation (ibid.) Thanissaro also 
draws upon the unanswered questions and the simile of 
the poisoned arrow to assert that the Buddha was only 
concerned with providing a pragmatic answer to the prob-
lem of dukkha and nothing further. For Thanissaro the 
anattā doctrine is not meant to answer questions such as 
'do I have a self' or 'do I exist' (Thanissaro, 2011 p. 3). 
Thanissaro argues that this view has some textual support: 
in the Ānanda Sutta (PTS:S iv 400) the Buddha refuses to 
answer Vacchagotta's question of 'is there no Self?' Simi-
larly in the Alagaddūpama Sutta it is stated that the brah-
mins falsely misrepresent the teaching of the Buddha stat-
ing 'the recluse Gotama is one who leads astray; he 
teaches the annihilation, the destruction, the extermina-
tion of an existing being’ (PTS: M i 141: Trans.Bodhi 
[2009]). Thanissaro presents the Buddha not as enquiring 
philosophically into the nature of the self but rather at-
tempting to answer the question of whether it is beneficial 
and skillful (kusala) to regard anything as 'mine' or 'my 
self' (Thanissaro, 2011 p. 4). To view the world as 'not-
self' is therefore a strategy for helping one avoid unskilful 
action and put an end to suffering. Thanissaro argues that 
the Buddha was not attacking the Upaniṣadic notion of 
the self, nor any other philosophical conception of self 
rather he completely put aside the philosophical question 
of whether or not there is a self and in its place recom-
mended that one practically view the world as 'not mine, 
not myself' as a therapeutic means to eliminate suffering 
(dukkha) (Thanissaro, 2011 p. 10) as a consequence 'the 
Buddha is not interested in defining who you are or what 
your self is' (Thanissaro, 2011 p. 13). To support this 
view Thanissaro refers to the Siṃsapā Sutta herein the 
Buddha states:  
 
'Bhikkhus, the things I have directly known but have not taught 
you are numerous, while the things I have taught you are few. 
And why, bhikkhus, have I not taught those many things? Be-
cause they are unbeneficial...and do not lead to cessation... to 
Nibbāna.... And what, bhikkhus, have I taught? I have taught: 
‘This is suffering’; I have taught: ‘This is the origin of suffer-
ing’; I have taught: ‘This is the cessation of suffering’; I have 
taught: ‘This is the way leading to the cessation of suffering.’ 
(PTS: S v 437. Trans. Bodhi 2000) 
 
Ruegg (1995) notes that the view that the Buddha was not 
a philosopher claims support from within the Suttas them-
selves, (as already noted) particularly the 
Cūḷamāluṅkyovada Sutta (PTS: M i 426) wherein the 
Buddha refuses to answer the questions put to him by 
Māluṅkyaputta (Ruegg, 1995 p. 149). The Buddha is the 
true doctor who pragmatically removes the poisoned 
arrow rather than dwelling fruitlessly on what sort of per-
son shot the arrow. The Buddha's teaching is therapeutic 
and questions which do not serve this therapeutic need are 
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to be excluded as irrelevant. Ruegg notes that the question 
of whether the Buddha was a philosopher, unsurprisingly, 
hinges on the definition of philosophy. If philosophy is 
understood as a pure analysis of concepts, language and 
meaning, Buddhism as a practical soteriology would not 
be considered purely philosophical (Ruegg, 1995 p.151). 
Nevertheless in Buddhism epistemology and metaphysics 
are closely bound up with the soteriological schema of the 
Four Noble Truths (cattāri ariya saccāni). Ruegg con-
tends that what the Buddha was rejecting was 'disputing 
for the sake of disputing rather than useful discussion and 
analysis' (Ruegg, 1995 p. 154). The Buddha rejects dispu-
tation and contentiousness for its own sake but not philo-
sophical reasoning per se. 
I would contend that the Buddha was a philosopher. 
Van Inwagen notes that a useful definition of metaphysics 
is as such: 'metaphysics is the study of ultimate reality' 
(Van Inwagen, 2015, p.1). Perhaps to avoid the ambigui-
ties inherent in the word 'ultimate' we could define meta-
physics as 'a general picture explaining the relation be-
tween human thought and the world' (Ronkin 2005, p. 
247). Though the Buddha was concerned with providing 
pragmatic advice to realise the cessation (nirodha) of suf-
fering (dukkha) this does not necessarily discount him 
from being categorised as a philosopher. This is particu-
larly evident in light of the fact that a sceptic such as Pyr-
rho (c. 360 – c. 270 BC) who emphasised indifference, 
impassivity and tranquillity in light of the fact that we 
must not trust perceptions (Svavarsson, 2010 p. 47), and 
was perhaps 'an unsystematic moral sage' (Svavarsson, 
2010 p. 37), is treated as a philosopher par excellence. 
Similarly Sextus Empiricus, who emphasised the suspen-
sion of assent to any belief (advising that tranquillity 
would ensue as a result), (Pellegrin, 2010 p. 125) is un-
doubtedly categorised as a philosopher within the West-
ern tradition. If we are to take Ronkin's definition of 
metaphysics here of 'a general picture explaining the rela-
tion between human thought and the world' (Ronkin 
2005, p. 247) we can see that some of what is written in 
the Suttas contains what could be termed metaphysics. 
This is particularly evident when examining the schemas 
of the aggregates (khandhas) and dependent origination 
(paṭiccasamuppāda). The khandhas are an attempt to pro-
vide a general picture of human experience by dividing it 
into matter (rūpa), feeling (vedanā), apperception 
(saññā),volition (saṅkhāra) and consciousness (viññāṇa) 
and analysing these elements of experience to demon-
strate that no permanent self can be found. This, accord-
ing to Ronkin and Van Inwagen's definitions, would cer-
tainly constitute metaphysics. Similarly dependent origi-
nation which explains the arising of old age and death 
(jarāmaraṇa) from ignorance (avijjā) seems to be in its 
most basic sense a picture explaining the relation between 
human thought (and action) and the world.  
In addition I would also assert that Thanissaro's 
(2011) assessment of the anattā doctrine is mistaken. In 
addition to being a practical strategy the anattā doctrine is 
a philosophical position which asserts that a substantial 
self cannot be found in reality. The Buddha's silence in 
regards to the unanswered questions can be understood by 
carefully analysing the texts. In regards to the 'un-
answered questions' it is plausible that questions one to 
four were dismissed purely as pointless speculation but it 
seems that there must be a further reason for the Buddha's 
refusal to answer questions five to ten, particularly in the 
light of the Buddha's teaching of No-Self. Collins notes 
that in the Commentaries Tathāgata is glossed once as 
attā (UdA. 340) which suggests that the questions regard-
ing the state of the Tathāgata after death are rejected be-
cause they assume the existence of an attā: 'they use per-
sonal referring terms, which according to Buddhist think-
ing have no real referent' (Collins 1982 p. 133). Philo-
sophically this is a case of 'presupposition failure'. The 
presupposition here is that there 'ultimately' exists an en-
tity denoted by the word attā. This presupposition in 
Buddhist thinking is false and hence the sentence 'does 
the Tathāgata exist after death' cannot be meaningfully 
decided because the terms employed 'relate to null sub-
jects' (Ruegg, 1977 p. 2). At the ultimate level the 
Tathāgata does not exist, it is therefore not meaningful to 
ask whether he exists after death. In the same way as the 
'soul' does not exist, it is not meaningful to ask whether it 
is identical with the body. 'The attā' is like the son of a 
barren woman in that there is nothing in reality to which it 
actually refers. 
The No-Self doctrine is therefore a middle way 
(majjhimāpaṭipadā) between the extreme positions of an-
nihilationism (ucchedavāda) and eternalism (sassata-
vāda). As explained in the Brahmajāla Sutta the core of 
the eternalist position is that the Self and the world are 
eternal (PTS: D i 1 ). Eternalism comprises, among oth-
ers, the view that the true Self (Skrt: ātman) and the 
macrocosm (brahman) are identical and change is an ap-
pearance (a belief found in the Upaniṣads, notably the 
Chāndogya and Bṛhadāraṇyaka and in later Advaita 
Vedānta) (Bodhi 1978 pp.16-19). Annihilationism, in its 
common form, teaches that death is the destruction of a 
substantially existing being and that death brings an end 
to all individual experience. One form identifies the self 
with the body and its elements which are dissolved upon 
death and as such death involves the annihilation of an 
existent being (PTS: D i 1 ). The No-Self doctrine is not 
annihilationism because there is no 'Self' to destroy. Nor 
is it eternalism, as an eternal Self (attā) is repudiated. It is 
rather a middle way between the two, a conventional self 
is accepted which is nonetheless ultimately a conceptual 
construction. 
The Buddha's refusal to answer Vacchagotta's ques-
tion of 'is there no self?' in the Ānanda Sutta (PTS:S iv 
400) can be explained as a refusal to side with the annihi-
lationists.The Buddha refused to reveal the metaphysic of 
the anattā doctrine to Vacchagotta on this occasion be-
cause he was already confused. The same Sutta states: 
'if...I had answered, “There is no self”, the wanderer Vac-
chagotta, already confused, would have fallen into even 
greater confusion, thinking, ‘It seems that the self I for-
merly had does not exist now.' (PTS:S iv 400. Trans. Bo-
dhi [2000]). Bhikkhu Bodhi commentating on the same 
Sutta argues that the reason the Buddha does not state 
outright that 'there is no self' is because such terminology 
was used by the annihilationists and he wished to avoid 
aligning his teaching with theirs in front of the bewildered 
Vacchagotta (Bodhi, 2000 p. 1457). This point is made 
more plausible when it is taken into account that some 
variants of the annihilationist teaching were accompanied 




Kesakambalī who taught the extermination of the existing 
being upon death with the result that there is no karmic 
fruit of good or bad deeds (Collins, 1982, p. 36). Indeed 
later in the same Sutta after the confused Vacchagotta has 
left, the Buddha states to Ānanda 'all phenomena are non-
self' (sabbe dhammā anattā) which is a restatement of the 
metaphysic of the No-Self doctrine. Far from being a 
purely practical strategy the anattā doctrine is a meta-
physic which states that no enduring, substantial self can 
be found in reality.  
Siderits (2015) notes that the Buddhist Suttas were 
written down several centuries after the Buddha's death 
and are in a language (Pāli) that he is unlikely to have 
spoken. It is therefore theoretically possible that the Bud-
dha in person rejected metaphysics and that the Suttas of 
the Pāli Canon are not faithful to his original intentions. 
Nevertheless the Suttas are the only comprehensive ac-
count we have of the earliest teaching of the Buddha and 
the only way to identify the 'historical Buddha' is through 
the lens of the Suttas. It cannot be fruitful therefore to 
speculate on theoretical possibilities such as the Suttas 
being unfaithful to the Buddha's original intentions. I 
would argue along with Siderits (2015) that the best way 
to understand the 'original' teaching of the Buddha is to 
engage with the Suttas via the medium of the later Bud-
dhist philosophical tradition. In the remainder of this pa-
per I will discuss two philosophical interpretations of the 
anattā doctrine: that found in the Abhidhamma, and that 




3. The Buddha's View of Language as Interpreted by 
Ronkin, Ñāṇananda and Nāgārjuna 
 
In this section I shall explore the view that the Buddha 
rejected a 'realist semantics' and how this view conflicts 
with the reductionist realism of Parfit. I will discuss the 
works of Gombrich (2009) who has argued that the Bud-
dha rejected the brahminical theory of language and 
Ñāṇananda (1971) who has argued that the dhamma can 
be conceived as a schema for the 'deconceptualisation of 
the mind' (Ñāṇananda, 1971 p. 27). I shall also analyse 
the work of Ronkin (2005) who has argued that the views 
of Nāgārjuna are closer to the Buddha's original message 
than the writings of Buddhaghosa. I will show how sup-
port for this thesis can be found in the Suttas. Finally I 
shall demonstrate how the view of Nāgārjuna is similar to 
that of Parfit at the level of conventional (Skrt: saṁvṛti) 
truth, but significantly different at the level of ultimate 
(Skrt: paramārtha) truth. 
Gombrich (2009, p. 149) posits that informing the 
teaching of the Buddha was a fundamental rejection of the 
brahminical theory of language Mī̄māṃsā. Mī̄māṃsā as 
one of the six schools of orthodox (skt: āstika) philosophy 
upheld a 'robust form of linguistic realism' (Arnold, 2011 
p. 138). For the Mīmāṃsaka the Vedas are authorless, un-
created and eternal, and consequently the Sanskrit lan-
guage from which they are composed is of an eternal na-
ture. In addition, according to this theory the relation be-
tween the Sanskrit word and the state of affairs denoted 
by the word is non-conventional. The word 'tree' (Skrt: 
vṛkṣa) for example describes an object that embodies a 
real and objectively existent universal: 'treeness'. The re-
lation between the word and the universal is not arbitrary 
but is rather a timeless and objectively real relation (Ar-
nold, 2011 p.143). Gombrich argues that, in light of the 
feature of the Buddhist worldview that all phenomena are 
impermanent (anicca), it is the case that there are no fixed 
and unchanging entities that can be captured by words. 
Indeed Gombrich states 'the Buddha concluded not 
merely that languages were conventional, but that it is in-
herently impossible for any language to fully capture re-
ality' (Gombrich, 2009, p. 149). It is the case that concep-
tualisation (saññā) which necessarily operates via fixed 
concepts such as 'man', 'woman', child and 'Buddha' can-
not fully capture a reality which is radically transient. In-
deed in the Anattalakkhaṇa Sutta the Buddha explicitly 
states that the process of conceptualisation (saññā) is im-
permanent and unsatisfactory. It stands to reason that such 
an impermanent (anicca) and unsatisfactory (dukkha) 
process could never fully capture the reality of the world 
(loka) which is also impermanent and unsatisfactory. 
This theme of the inadequacy of conceptualisation 
(saññā) is taken up by Ronkin who argues that the teach-
ing of the early Suttas emphasises the inadequacy of the 
process of thought and by extension language. The point 
here is that the naming process itself is a product of ap-
perception (saññā) and 'making manifold' (papañceti) and 
hence dependently originated. To rely on language to 
convey ultimate truth is therefore to grasp at conditioned 
reality (saṃsāra) which will result in suffering. The rejec-
tion of all speculative opinions by the Buddha therefore 
amounts, according to Ronkin, to a rejection of the human 
cognitive apparatus itself and an assertion that mental 
proliferation (papañca) and the process of making mani-
fold (papañceti) are the root of the disease of suffering 
(dukkha). (Ronkin, 2005, pp. 246-247). Similarly Gom-
brich, states 'the very act of conceptualizing, the Buddha 
held, thus involves some inaccuracy. His term for this was 
papañca' (Gombrich 2009 p.150). Language can point to 
reality but can never fully capture its fluidity.  
Of particular relevance to this point is the Mad-
hupiṇḍika Sutta. Here it is asserted that: 
 
'What one perceives, that one thinks about. What one thinks 
about, that one mentally proliferates (papañca). With what one 
has mentally proliferated as the source, perceptions and notions 
[born of] mental proliferation beset a man with respect to past, 
future, and present mind-objects cognizable through the 
mind...Bhikkhu, as to the source through which perceptions and 
notions [born of] mental proliferation beset a man: if nothing is 
found there to delight in, welcome, and hold to, this is the end of 
the underlying tendency to lust, of the underlying tendency to 
aversion,. . of the underlying tendency to ignorance...here these 
evil unwholesome states cease without remainder,’ (PTS M i 
108: Trans.Bodhi [2009]) 
 
In order to understand this Sutta we must first understand 
the notion of papañca. Papañca conveys such meanings 
as 'spreading out', 'expansion', and 'manifoldness' (Ñāṇa-
nanda, 1971 p. 4). It is a comprehensive term 'hinting at 
the tendency of the...imagination to break loose and run 
riot' (Ñāṇananda, 1971 p. 4). It can mean 'mental prolifer-
ation', 'prolific conceptualisation' or 'mental rambling'. 
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Papañca tends to obscure subjective experience by giving 
rise to obsessions. As in the legend of the resurrected tiger 
who ate the magician that brought it to life, concepts and 
linguistic conventions overwhelm the man who has ev-
olved them (Ñāṇananda, 1971 p. 6). Language assumes an 
objective character due to its stability and assails the indi-
vidual with a tangled net of views (diṭṭhijāla). According 
to Bodhi papañca is 'the propensity of the worldling’s 
imagination to erupt in an effusion of mental commentary 
that obscures the bare data of cognition' (Bodhi, 2009 p. 
1204). Necessarily bound up with mental proliferation is 
the separation of the world into self and non-self and the 
accompanying views 'this is mine' (etaṁ mama) and 'this 
is my self' (eso me atta). From this matrix of superim-
posed ego arises views (diṭṭhi), thirst (taṇhā) and conceit 
(māna). (Ñāṇananda, 1971 pp. 6-12) 
The Madhupiṇḍika Sutta asserts that in order to end 
the obsessions of views and the suffering that it entails 
one must dis-identify with the process of prolific concep-
tualisation (papañca). The argumentative thrust of the 
Sutta therefore suggests that thinking itself is fundamen-
tally a product of saṃsāric conditioned existence and in-
timately bound up with suffering (dukkha). According to 
Ñāṇananda the dhamma can be seen as a schema for the 
'deconceptualisation of the mind' (Ñāṇananda, 1971 p. 
27): wholesome thoughts are used to drive out unwhole-
some ones just as a carpenter would use a small peg to 
knock out a larger one (PTS: M i 118). Yet wholesome 
thoughts are ultimately to be replaced by wisdom (paññā) 
which is not characterised by discursive thought and is 
'immediate and intuitive' (ibid.). Indeed in the Poṭṭhapāda 
Sutta the stages of jhāna meditation are described until the 
summit of consciousness is reached – the cessation of 
conceptualisation (saññā).  
 
As he remains at the peak of perception, the thought occurs to 
him, 'thinking is bad for me. Not thinking is better for me....so 
he neither thinks nor wills, and as he is neither thinking nor will-
ing, that perception ceases and another, grosser perception does 
not appear. He touches cessation. This, Potthapada, is … the 
ultimate cessation of perception [saññā]. (PTS: D i 178. Trans. 
Thanissaro [2013]) 
 
Ñāṇananda argues that the nature of sense experience is 
such that as soon as one conceptualises the raw sense data 
of experience one is led astray. The Goal is being able to 
correctly perceive sense data without being misled by 
their implications in terms of mental proliferation. Ac-
cording to Ñāṇananda the sense data that enters the mind 
of the arahant does not reverberate as conceptual prolifer-
ation by way of thirst, conceit and views (papañca- 
taṇhā- māna- diṭṭhi). Rather the emancipated sage is 
characterised by inner stillness, having gone beyond all 
speculative views (diṭṭhi) (Ñāṇananda 1971 pp. 31-39) 
and particularly having gone beyond the notion of the self 
(attā). 
In opposition to the Commentaries which take diṭṭhi to 
mean the sixty-two false views (micchā- diṭṭhi) as op-
posed to the right view (sammā-diṭṭhi) of the path 
(magga) Ñāṇananda defines diṭṭhi as a 'deep seated ten-
dency.... to be beguiled by concepts' (Ñāṇananda 1971 p. 
40). As per the simile of the raft in the Alagaddūpama 
Sutta even the dhamma as right view (sammā-diṭṭhi) is 
only a raft for the purpose of crossing over to the far 
shore of nibbāna not for grasping on to. As such one 
'should let go even of right mental objects (dhammas), to 
say nothing of wrong ones' (PTS: M i 130. Trans: 
Ñāṇananda ). Right view (sammā-diṭṭhi) therefore con-
tains 'the seed of its own transcendence as its purpose is to 
purge the mind of all views including itself' (Ñāṇananda 
1971 p. 43). As the purpose of this practice is to purge the 
mind of all views (diṭṭhi) even those views which are of 
great help to the practitioner must eventually be expelled. 
(Ñāṇananda 1971 p. 44). The state of the one who has at-
tained nibbāna (as described in the Nibbāna Sutta) is such 
that: 
 
There is neither earth, nor water, nor fire, nor wind; neither di-
mension of the infinitude of space, nor dimension of the infini-
tude of consciousness, nor dimension of nothingness, nor di-
mension of neither perception nor non-perception; neither this 
world, nor the next world, nor sun, nor moon. And there, I say, 
there is neither coming, nor going, nor staying; neither passing 
away nor arising: unestablished, unevolving, without support 
[mental object]. This, just this, is the end of dukkha. (PTS: Ud 
80. Trans Thanissaro [2012]) 
 
The liberated sage who has attained unbinding sees 
through the concepts of the phenomenal world and ex-
periences emptiness (suññāta) (Ñāṇananda 1971 p. 73). 
The arahant therefore attains 'the utter cessation of the 
world of concepts' (Ñāṇananda 1971 p.109). The early 
Buddhist attitude was to 'realise the imperfections of lan-
guage and logic by observing the internal and external 
conflict it brought about' (Ñāṇananda 1971 p. 108). It was 
not necessary to counter every thesis with an antithesis 
rather the general principle of dukkha and its cessation 
was advanced 'which provides the true impetus for the 
spiritual endeavour to transcend all theories by eradicat-
ing the subjective bias' (ibid.). Ideas of permanence 
(nicca) and Self (attā) are what the mind imposes upon 
objects. The attā therefore is something experienced 
within the mind, it is not a phenomenon 'out there'. The 
Buddha is primarily attacking the tendency of the mind to 
subjectively superimpose the notion of an attā upon ex-
perience. (Ñāṇananda 1971 pp. 103- 108).  
From this view of language and reality a radical meta-
physics can be discerned – that is if we take metaphysics 
in its broadest sense to mean 'a general picture explaining 
the relation between human thought and the world' 
(Ronkin 2005, pp. 247). The Buddha rejects the notion 
that the world is composed of existing substances and that 
language can refer to these substances (Ronkin, 2005, pp. 
244-247). This entails a rejection of semantic realism. 
Semantic realism is the view that a statement has an ob-
jective truth value in virtue of its relation to an independ-
ently existing reality and statements are true or false inde-
pendent of our means of knowing them (Hale, 1997). This 
view is to be contrasted with semantic anti-realism which 
denies that statements are true or false in an objective or 
ultimate sense. This distinction can be made clearer by 
examining the realism/anti-realism debate in the philoso-
phy of mathematics: the realist about mathematics would 
accept the existence of numbers and sets which exist ob-
jectively, independent of the human mind. The anti-realist 




istence of numbers and may assert in its place a construc-
tivist theory in which numbers, sets and the like are 
fundamentally the product of human thought and do not 
have a basis in 'mind-independent' reality (Hale, 1997). 
Likewise the Buddhist semantic anti-realist asserts that 
truth and language are fundamentally a product of the 
human mind. Sentences are true or false depending on 
how they accord with commonly accepted conventions. 
They have no 'ultimate' or objective truth value independ-
ent of the human conventions of language. This semantic 
anti-realism is the position of the Buddha according to 
Ronkin, for the Buddha 'reality' is subjective experience 
and it is not meaningful to speak of a mind-independent 
reality: 'It is in this fathom-long body endowed with per-
ception and mind that I proclaim the world, the origin of 
the world, the cessation of the world, and the way leading 
to the cessation of the world' (PTS: A ii 49: Trans. Bodhi 
[2012]). According to Ronkin 'the awakened mind breaks 
up the apparently solid world that we construct for our-
selves' (Ronkin, 2005 p. 246) and realises that words and 
concepts do not ultimately name anything. This is the si-
lence of the eschewal of all views. Hence the statement of 
the Buddha '“speculative view” is something that the 
Tathāgata has put away'. (PTS: M i 487. Trans. Bodhi 
[2012]). 
Ronkin posits that by the time of the Abhidhamma 
Commentaries this view of the nature of language had 
been lost and the No-Self doctrine had become one of re-
ductionist realism. The dhammas becoming phenomena 
which exist in mind independent reality (in virtue of pos-
sessing sabhāva) and the 'self' being a convenient label 
for a bundle of mental and physical dhammas. This as-
sumes a realist ontology (the dhammas being ultimately 
real) and a realist semantics in which words bear an ob-
jective relation to ultimate reality (Ronkin 2005 p. 249). 
For Ronkin the Abhidhamma dissects experience and 
brings it within our conceptual and linguistic framework, 
yet 'this conceptual delineating or giving of boundaries is 
exactly what the verb papañceti, “making manifold” 
means' (Ronkin 2005 p. 249). The practice of taking con-
cepts to accurately reflect reality and clinging to them as 
views (diṭṭhi) is precisely what the Buddha had warned 
against in the Madhupiṇḍika Sutta.  
According to Ronkin 'the earliest Buddhist teaching 
discloses tenor analogues to Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka' 
(Ronkin, 2005 p. 248). Key to understanding the thought 
of Nāgārjuna is the notion of the two truths: conventional 
(Skrt: saṁvṛti) and ultimate (Skrt: paramārtha). In The 
Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way (Mūlamadhya-
makakārikā) Nāgārjuna states 'the dharma teaching of the 
Buddha rests on two truths: conventional truth and ulti-
mate truth' (MMK, 24.8) (Siderits and Katsura, 2013 
p.272). At the conventional level Nāgārjuna accepts a 
non-substantial self which can be reduced to the function-
ing of the five aggregates (Pāli: khandhas, Skrt: skand-
has): matter (Pāli: rūpa, Skrt: rūpa ), feeling (Pāli: 
vedanā, Skrt: vedanā), apperception (Pāli: saññā, Skrt: 
saṃjñā), formations (Pāli: saṅkhāra, Skrt: saṃskāra ) and 
consciousness (Pāli: viññāṇa, Skrt: vijñāna ). This 'self' 
can persist over time, be reborn, perform skilful and un-
skilful actions and can reap the karmic fruits of past 
deeds. Yet unlike Buddaghosa, for Nāgārjuna this 'truth' 
of a self which can be reduced to the five khandhas is 
only assertable in virtue of the commonly accepted lin-
guistic practices of human beings. It is a conventional 
truth not an ultimate truth. At the ultimate level there is 
only the truth of emptiness (śūnyatā). 
According to the doctrine of emptiness (śūnyatā) 
nothing in the world exists with inherent existence or 
'substance' (svabhāva). Objects possessing svabhāva con-
stitute the 'ontological rock bottom' (Westerhoff, 2017) of 
the world, and are those entities which exist in their own 
right. This notion is best understood by use of example: 
one may assert that 'tables' do not exist in reality but only 
the atoms which make up the table, the 'table' itself being 
a conceptual construct. In this example the atoms would 
possess svabhāva. Nāgārjuna asserts that ultimately noth-
ing in the world exists with svabhāva and hence asserts 
that nothing exists objectively or in its own right – every-
thing is empty. For the Mādhyamika, ultimately, there is 
no 'way things objectively are', there is no inherent and 
objective structure to reality independent of the human 
mind. The Mādhyamika will not therefore accept seman-
tic realism, this being the theory that statements are objec-
tively true or false in virtue of their relation to independ-
ently existing reality. What is asserted in its place is a 
conventional theory of truth in which statements can be 
asserted only if they agree with commonly accepted prac-
tices and conventions (ibid.). For Nāgārjuna even the 
ultimate truth of emptiness is itself empty – it is not ulti-
mately true in the sense that it corresponds to the way re-
ality 'really is' independent of human conventions. There 
are not objects in the world which have the property of 
being empty. Rather the doctrine of emptiness is rather an 
attempt to stop the mistaken ascription of svabhāva to 
phenomena by the human mind (Westerhoff, 2017). 
This can be investigated by exploring the Dispeller of 
Disputes (Vigrahavyāvartanī) of Nāgārjuna. Herein 
Nāgārjuna states 'I do not have any thesis...while all 
things are empty... free from substance, from where could 
a thesis come' (Westerhoff, 2010 pp. 29-30). According to 
this passage Nāgārjuna states that ultimately he does not 
have any substantial thesis, that is any thesis which can be 
described according to a realist semantics – a semantics 
wherein statements can capture real and objectively exist-
ing entities in the world. All statements are conventional 
as the very notion of a realist semantics is ruled out by the 
Madhyamaka theory of emptiness (Skrt: śūnyatā) 
(Westerhoff, 2010 pp. 64-65). Propositions are only ap-
plicable to those entities which are a product of mental 
proliferation (papañca, Skrt prapañca) (Ruegg, 1977 pp. 
12). In The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way 
(Mūlamadhyamakakārikā) Nāgārjuna states 'independ-
ently realised, peaceful, unobsessed by obsessions, with-
out discriminations and a variety of meanings: such is the 
characteristic of truth' (MMK 18.9) (Kalupahana, 1986 p. 
270). Nāgārjuna here is making an epistemological point, 
according to the Buddha, man searching for permanence 
misses the impermanent nature of experience. In referring 
to 'peace' (Skrt: śānta) and 'obsession' (Skrt: prapañca) 
(MMK 18.9) in this context Nāgārjuna is referring to the 
peace of mind attained by one rid of the delusion of per-
manence, free from the obsession (Skrt: prapañca) of the 
search for ultimate truths in terms of existence or non-
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existence (Kalupahana, 1986 p. 272). This notion mirrors 
Ronkin's interpretation of the Madhupiṇḍika Sutta which 
warns against the same 'obsessions' or mental prolifer-
ations (papañca) and the misleading nature of conceptual-
isation. 
When we assess the view of the No-Self doctrine as 
presented by Nāgārjuna in this light we can see that there 
are key differences between this doctrine and reductionist 
notions of the self as espoused by philosophers such as 
Derek Parfit. Parfit claims that the facts of personal iden-
tity 'just consists in the holding of certain more particular[ 
that is more basic] facts.' (Parfit, 1984, p. 210). This view 
is firmly realist, it assumes that there are certain facts 
about the way the mind-independent world is and that 
these facts can be fully described using language. Parfit 
states: 'we could give a complete description of reality 
without claiming that persons exist' [emphasis added] 
(Parfit, 1984 p.212).  
At the conventional level the views of Parfit and 
Nāgārjuna are similar, both accept a non-substantial self 
which can be reduced to either the processes of brain and 
body or the khandhas. Yet at the ultimate level Nāgārjuna 
does not accept reductionism as he rejects a realist seman-
tics. For Nāgārjuna concepts can only conventionally, not 
factually describe the world. This is in contrast to the 
view of Parfit (and as I shall more fully demonstrate later, 
Buddhaghosa), who assumes that ultimately the external 
world can be described objectively and factually. Parfit 
describes the reductionist position as such: 'the fact of a 
person's identity over time just consists in the holding of 
certain more particular facts' (Parfit, 1984 p. 210). With 
this in mind we must conclude that at the ultimate level 
(as opposed to the conventional level) Nāgārjuna is not a 
reductionist about the self. At the ultimate level 
Nāgārjuna rejects the notion of an objective 'factual' re-
ality, he therefore does not accept the key tenet of reduc-
tionism that 'the fact of a person's identity over time just 
consists in the holding of certain more particular facts'. 
For Nāgārjuna ultimately there are no such facts, there is 
only emptiness: 'for the Mādhyamika not only is there no 
substantial self, there is also no substantial basis on which 
a nonsubstantial self could be built' (Westerhoff, 2009, p. 
163). This is in opposition to the reductionist view of 
Buddhaghosa –who holds the khandhas to be the substan-
tial basis upon which a non-substantial self is built – and 
Parfit who holds the processes of brain and body to be 
such a basis. It is the case therefore that Nāgārjuna ac-
cepts the No-Self doctrine but rejects the reductionist No-
Self doctrine of Buddhaghosa as an ultimate truth. 
A strong case can be made that the views of 
Nāgārjuna can be traced back to the early Suttas. Kalupa-
hana presents Nāgārjuna not as an innovator but rather as 
a grand commentator on the early Pāli Suttas who did not 
try to improve upon the original teachings of the Buddha 
but rather explicated them in their original form (Kalupa-
hana, 1986 p. 5). For Kalupahana Nāgārjuna's philosophy 
is a restatement of the original philosophy of the Buddha 
(Kalupahana, 1986 p. 8). According to the Pāli Kaccāya-
nagotta Sutta '“everything exists”...is one extreme' and 
'“everything does not exist”...is the second extreme' 'with-
out approaching either extreme the Tathāgata teaches you 
a doctrine by the middle' (PTS: S ii 16. Trans. Kalupa-
hana, 1986, pp. 10-11). This middle way is the teaching 
of dependent arising (paṭiccasamuppāda) which is the 
view that phenomena (that is elements of experience) give 
rise to other phenomena under certain causal conditions 
and these phenomena cease when the relevant causal con-
ditions are absent. This is the mechanism by which the 
Buddha was able to explain phenomena without resorting 
to the concept of a permanent entity (Kalupahana, 1986 p. 
34). Nāgārjuna wrote the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā both as 
a commentary on the Kaccāyanagotta Sutta (Kalupahana, 
1986 p. 5) and as an attempt to discredit 'heterodox' 
schools particularly the Sautrāntikas and Sarvāstivādins 
(Kalupahana, 1986 p. 26). In the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 
the key themes of early Buddhism are taken up not, ac-
cording to Kalupahana, to reject them but rather to rid 
them of metaphysical explanation in terms of absolute ex-
istence (eternalism) or non-existence (annihilationism) 
(Kalupahana, 1986 p. 29) these are the same views that 
the Buddha was rejecting in the Kaccāyanagotta Sutta.  
For Nāgārjuna belief in substantial entities such as the 
Self (Skrt: ātman) gives rise to grasping, possession and 
in turn obsessive mental proliferations (Skrt: prapañca). 
This process can be stopped by the recognition of empti-
ness (śūnyatā) in regards to the ātman and all phenomena 
(Skrt: dharmas) (Kaluphanana, 1986 p. 56). Antecedents 
to this emptiness doctrine can be found in the Suttas of 
the Pāli canon, notably the Pheṇa Sutta. Herein it is said: 
 
'Bhikkhus, suppose that this river Ganges was carrying along a 
great lump of foam. A man with good sight would inspect it...it 
would appear to him to be void, hollow, insubstantial. For what 
substance could there be in a lump of foam? So too, bhikkhus, 
whatever kind of form there is, whether past, future, or present, 
internal or external, gross or subtle, inferior or superior, far or 
near: a bhikkhu inspects it, ponders it, and carefully investigates 
it, and it would appear to him to be void, hollow, insubstantial. 
For what substance could there be in form?' (PTS: S iii 140 
Trans. Bodhi [2000]). 
 
'Form is like a lump of foam, Feeling like a water bubble; Per-
ception is like a mirage, Volitions like a plantain trunk, And 
consciousness like an illusion, So explained the Kinsman of the 
Sun. “However one may ponder it and carefully investigate it, it 
appears but hollow and void when one views it carefully”.' 
(PTS: S iii 140 Trans. Bodhi [2000]). 
 
Commentating on this Sutta Bhikkhu Bodhi notes that the 
imagery relating to the empty nature of conditioned phe-
nomena was taken up by the Mādhyamikas (Bodhi, 2000, 
pp. 1085-6). The emptiness doctrine of Nāgārjuna is 
therefore to be found in a nascent form in the early Suttas. 
The seeds of this doctrine in the Suttas giving rise to the 
fully grown sprout of the Madhyamaka philosophy of 
emptiness. 
It is also interesting to note that the tetralemma 
(catuṣkoṭi) found in the Cūḷamāluṅkyovada Sutta (PTS: 
M i 426) was taken up by the Mādhyamikas 'to establish 
the inapplicabilty of any imaginable conceptual posi-
tion...that might be taken as the subject of an existential 
proposition' (Ruegg, 1977 p. 9) and therefore become the 
basis for a set of doctrinal extremes. The tetralemma is as 
follows: 
 
1.) Does the Tathāgata exist after death?  




3.) Does the Tathāgata both exist and does not exist after death?  
4.) Does the Tathāgata neither exist nor does not exist after 
death? 
 
For Nāgārjuna the Buddha rejected the tetralemma in re-
gards to the state of the Tathāgata because his existence 
was asserted in a 'real and absolute sense' (Kalupahana, 
1986 p. 309) it is a substantial view of the self which 
leads to speculations as to the state of the Tathāgata after 
his death and this in addition to any corresponding specu-
lations should be rejected. Hence according to the 
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 'when he is empty in terms of 
self-nature, the thought that the Buddha exists or does not 
exist after death is not appropriate' (MMK 22.14) (Kalu-
pahana, 1986 p. 309). Just as the Tathāgata is devoid of 
self-nature so too 'the universe is also devoid of self-
nature' (MMK 22.16) (Kalupahana, 1986 p. 310). 
Nāgārjuna asserts '“empty”, “non-empty”, “both” or “nei-
ther” -these should not be declared. It is expressed only 
for the purpose of communication' (MMK 22.11) (Kalu-
pahana, 1986 p. 307). Here Nāgārjuna rejects any theoris-
ing regarding emptiness, using the four cornered logic of 
the catuṣkoṭi. The terms 'empty' or 'non-empty' are only 
used for the purpose of communication and should not be 
reified and taken as something possessing essential nature 
(Skrt: svabhāva) (Kalupahana, 1986 p. 308). This should 
be seen as the rejection of concepts as 'incorruptible reals' 
(ibid.) and as an assertion of a conventional and prag-
matic theory of truth and language. 
Based on the above it can be surmised that the views 
of Nāgārjuna can be traced back to the Suttas of the early 
Canon. At the very least it is possible to assert that the 
seeds of the Madhyamaka emptiness doctrine and corres-
ponding theory of language can be found in the Suttas, 
particularly the Pheṇa Sutta and the Madhupiṇḍika Sutta, 
seeds which bore their fully developed fruit in the Mad-
hyamaka philosophy. For Nāgārjuna as the world is 
empty of svabhāva there is no fixed way the world ulti-
mately 'is'. This worldview results in a rejection of a 
realist semantics. As I have previously asserted this view 
is very different to the reductionism of Parfit, who accepts 
a realist semantics, or at the least assumes it in Reasons 
and Persons.  
I would assert that it can be maintained that there is an 
element of reductionism in the philosophy of Nāgārjuna 
at the level of conventional truth. This is because 
Nāgārjuna accepts a conventional self which can be re-
duced to the functioning of the five khandhas. Neverthe-
less for Nāgārjuna at the ultimate level all dhammas are 
empty including the khandhas. This doctrine of emptiness 
has the implication of the rejection of a realist semantics 
rendering the position of Nāgārjuna very different to that 
of reductionism as espoused by Parfit. Parfit asserts that 
the self is unreal (or, more specifically, real only in virtue 
of the way we use language), whereas the parts, that is the 
psycho-physical processes of brain and body are ulti-
mately constituents of reality. Nāgārjuna on the other 
hand asserts that all of reality is empty of svabhāva and 
hence there is no fixed structure to 'reality' at all. Whereas 
there is a conventional self which can be reduced to the 
khandhas ultimately even the khandhas do not possess 
'reality' or inherent existence (svabhāva). 
In the next section I will examine the reductionism of the 
Abhidhamma and the Abhidhamma Commentaries of 
Buddhaghosa. I will show how this view of the self is re-
ductionist in the truest sense. I will assert that the view 
found in the Abhidhamma Commentaries displays more 




4. The Position of the Abhidhamma and its Commen-
taries. 
 
In this section I will outline the view of the Buddhist doc-
trine of No-Self (anattā) as exemplified in the Path of 
Purification (Visuddhimagga) of Buddhaghosa and the 
Abhidhamma Commentaries. I will show how this view is 
similar to reductionist views of the self put forward by 
Western philosophers such as David Hume and Derek 
Parfit.  
The Abhidhamma which can be translated as 'about 
(abhi-) the dhamma' (Anālayo, 2014 p. 78) can be seen as 
growing out of the early followers of the Buddha's psy-
chological need to make the teachings of the Buddha as 
comprehensive as possible (Anālayo, 2014 p. 169) and to 
clarify any ambiguity or incomplete aspects of the origi-
nal teaching. This drive to give a complete picture of all 
aspects connected with the Buddhist Path grew interde-
pendently with the idea that the Buddha attained omnisci-
ence upon his awakening (ibid.). The tradition of the 
Commentaries holds that the Abhidhamma was ex-
pounded by the Buddha to an assembly of deities (devas) 
in the Tāvatiṃsa heaven, and hence is the authentic word 
of the Buddha himself (buddhavacana) (Bodhi, 2000A 
p.11). Yet the Abhidhamma may have had more mundane 
origins and Anālayo asserts that the Abhidhamma seems 
to have had its origin as a communally recited commen-
tary on the Suttas which gradually evolved into a 'higher' 
teaching: 'abhi-' itself taking on the meaning of 'higher' 
rather than simply 'about' (Anālayo, 2014 p. 116). 
 The Theravādin Abhidhamma is comprised of seven 
books the Dhammasaṅgaṇi (Enumeration of Dhammas), 
the Vibhaṅga (Analysis), the Dhātukathā (Discourse on 
Elements), the Puggalapaññatti (Designation of Persons), 
the Kathāvatthu (Points of Discussion), the Yamaka 
(Pairs), and the Paṭṭhāna (Causal Conditions) (Ronkin, 
2017). They are treatises in which the doctrine of the Sut-
tas have been systematised, tabulated and meticulously 
organised (Bodhi, 2000A p. 2). The cornerstone of the 
Abhidhamma is the dhamma theory which maintains that 
the 'fundamental components of actuality' (Bodhi, 2000A 
p. 3), that is the building blocks of ultimate reality are 
dhammas, 'momentary mental and material phenomena 
which constitute the process of experience' (ibid.). Reality 
is constructed upon the foundation of the dhammas which 
possess, ultimate reality and determinate existence 
(sabhāva) 'from their own side' (sarūpato) (ibid.). Bodhi 
notes that in the Abhidhamma the dhamma theory is not 
'expressed as an explicit philosophical tenet' (ibid.) but is 
rather implicit in the texts. This implicit doctrine being 
expressed as a fully fledged theory in the Commentaries 
of Buddhaghosa. These Commentaries are the Atthasālinī 
(The Expositor) the commentary on the Dhammasaṅgaṇi; 
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the Sammohavinodanī, (The Dispeller of Delusion) the 
commentary on the Vibhanga; and the Pañcappakara-
naṭṭhakathā,the commentary on the remaining five trea-
tises (Bodhi, 2000A p. 13). In the Atthasālinī it is written 
'there is nothing else [but dhammas], whether a being, or 
an entity, or a man or a person' (Atthasālinī 155) (Trans. 
Ronkin 2017). The principle here being that the phenom-
enal world at the ultimate level is a world of dhammas 
and there is no other ultimate reality apart from the reality 
of the dhammas (Ronkin, 2017). Bodhi maintains that 
such a conception of reality is already present in nascent 
form in the Suttas (Bodhi, 2000A p. 3), particularly in the 
Buddha's analysis of the five aggregates (khandhas) 
(PTS: S iii 66), the analysis of the six sense bases 
(saḷāyatana) (PTS: M iii 215), and the enumeration of 
dependent origination (paṭiccasamuppāda) (PTS: S ii 2 ). 
Here there is a tendency to analyse experience into its 
fundamental building blocks and from this foundation ex-
plain the arising of suffering causally. 
In a statement that resembles Parfit's reductionist view 
of the self Bodhi describes the Abhidhamma project as 
attempting to drive a wedge between ultimately real enti-
ties, that is the dhammas, and those entities which exist 
only as conceptual constructs, such as the self (Bodhi. 
2000A p. 4). The Abhidhamma primarily seeks to com-
prehend the nature of experience and the reality that is the 
focus of the Abhidhamma is the conscious reality of hu-
man experience (ibid.). Nevertheless by the time of the 
Abhidhamma Commentaries dhammas come to be taken 
to exist in mind-independent reality and are invested with 
ontological significance, the dhammas being those entities 
which comprise the ultimate constituents of reality in vir-
tue of being invested with sabhāva (Ronkin 2005 pp. 248-
249). Ronkin asserts that the worldview of the Commen-
taries resembles Leibniz's monadological metaphysics 
(ibid.) which is the view that everything in the world is 
composed of simple substances, which form the founda-
tion of reality (Look, 2017). This latter view present in 
the Commentaries is therefore a fully fledged reduction-
ism with the acceptance of a realist semantics. The self 
does not exist in reality but is rather a conceptual fiction. 
Just as a 'nation' can be reduced to those entities which 
exist in reality e.g. human beings located in a certain geo-
graphical area acting in certain ways, so too the 'self' can 
be reduced to those entities which actually exist in reality: 
for Parfit these are the psycho-physical processes of brain 
and body, for Buddhaghosa it is the dhammas. 
As the Abhidhamma Commentaries accept the posi-
tion that there are ultimately real entities, that is those 
entities possessing sabhāva a strong case can be made 
that the Abhidhamma Commentaries accept a realist se-
mantics. The Abhidhamma Commentaries accept that 
there is a way ultimate reality is and that language can 
describe this ultimate reality. Statements about the self 
will be true or false depending on their relation to this 
ultimate reality of dhammas. Ronkin asserts that the 
Commentators 'endow the final products of their analysis 
with the status of ultimate facts', the dhammas are under-
stood as the building blocks of reality and to understand 
that reality is composed of dhammas is to understand the 
way things really are (Ronkin, 2005 p. 119). The Abhid-
hamma metaphysics paves the way for the acceptance of a 
realist semantics (Ronkin 2005, p. 153): the theory that a 
statement has an objective truth value in virtue of its rela-
tion to an independently existing reality. The position of 
the Abhidhamma Commentaries is therefore a reductionist 
realism that is similar in structure to the view of Parfit. 
Just as for Parfit the 'self' or a 'person' can be reduced, 
ultimately to facts about the brain and body (Parfit, 1984, 
p. 210) and presumably further to a set of deeper facts 
about atoms, electrons, quarks etc. In the same manner in 
the Abhidhamma Commentaries all facts about the self 
can be reduced to impersonal facts about the dhammas. 
The dhammas can be understood conceptually and can be 
described using language with sentences which are ulti-
mately true or false. This is reductionism in the truest 
sense and the views of the Abhidhamma Commentaries 
and of Parfit display striking similarities in this respect.  
Bodhi asserts that the Abhidhamma does not proclaim 
a new doctrine not found in the Suttas (Bodhi, 2000A p. 
5). The difference between the Abhidhamma and the Sut-
tas is one of scope and method (ibid.). In the Suttas the 
Buddha makes use of conventional parlance for pragmatic 
reasons in order to guide his audience which had differing 
capacities for understanding his message. The Abhid-
hamma on the other hand 'rigorously restricts itself to 
terms that are valid from the standpoint of ultimate truth' 
(paramatthasacca) (Bodhi, 2000A p. 6) -- though this dis-
tinction is not absolute and the Suttas themselves contain 
discourses strictly relating to ultimate truth. Bodhi, in op-
position to the views of Ronkin asserts that whilst it is 
tempting to trace some historical development of ideas 
between the Abhidhamma and the Commentaries this line 
of thought should 'not be pushed too far' (Bodhi, 2000A p. 
14). This is due to the fact that the Abhidhamma requires 
the Commentaries to give context and provide a unified 
and systematic meaning to the material. Bodhi contends 
that without the Commentaries important elements of 
meaning would be lost and as such the Abhidhamma and 
the Commentaries should be taken as a whole (Bodhi, 
2000A pp.13-14).  
The reductionist realism which is to be found in the 
Abhidhamma Commentaries is not necessarily a novel 
development not found in the Suttas. Rather it is the case 
that the seeds of the reductionist realist position can be 
found in the Suttas themselves, as even Wynne, (an oppo-
nent of the reductionist realist position) notes (Wynne 
2010 p. 157). These seeds developed into the fully 
fledged reductionist realism of the Abhidhamma Com-
mentaries.. In the Vajirā Sutta the nun Vajirā exclaims to 
Māra, the Evil One: 
 
Why now do you assume ‘a being’? Māra, is that your specula-
tive view? This is a heap of sheer formations: Here no being is 
found. “Just as, with an assemblage of parts, The word ‘chariot’ 
is used, So, when the aggregates exist [khandhesu santesu], 
There is the convention ‘a being.’ “It’s only suffering that comes 
to be, Suffering that stands and falls away. Nothing but suffering 
comes to be, Nothing but suffering ceases (PTS: S i 134 Trans. 
Bodhi 2000) 
 
Here the reductionist realist view is stated explicitly: it is 
conventionally true that there is a self as a collection of 
khandhas. Nevertheless it is an ultimate metaphysical 
truth that 'no being is to be found'. The statement of 




structured and that language is capable of describing this 
reality: the 'Vajirā Sutta is both reductionistic as well as 
realistic, for it speaks of the aggregates “existing” 
(khandhesu santesu) and of the failure to “find” an essen-
tial being in them (na yidha sattūpalabbhati)' (Wynne 
2010 p. 157). The presence of such a clear statement of 
reductionist realism in the early Suttas calls into question 
the view that a radical shift in metaphysical outlook can 
be traced between the philosophy of the Suttas and the 
philosophy of the Abhidhamma Commentaries of 
Buddhaghosa. Indeed Buddhaghosa echoes the sentiment 
of the Vajirā Sutta precisely in the Visuddhimagga: 
 
'Therefore, just as when the component parts such as axles, 
wheels, frame poles, etc., are arranged in a certain way, there 
comes to be the mere term of common usage “chariot,” yet in 
the ultimate sense when each part is examined there is no 
chariot... —so too, when there are the five aggregates [as ob-
jects] of clinging, there comes to be the mere term of common 
usage “a being,” “a person,” yet in the ultimate sense, when 
each component is examined, there is no being' Visuddhimagga 
(XVIII, 28) [Trans. Ñāṇamoli (2010)] 
 
In addition antecedents of the dhamma theory can be 
traced back to the Suttas. The Mahāhatthipadopama Sutta 
(PTS: M i 184) provides an exhaustive list of the human 
being in terms of the earth, wind, fire, water and space 
elements. Whilst asserting that these basic elements exist 
it concludes that no independent attā can be found upon 
analysis of the constituents of a human being. The Sutta 
therefore espouses a realist ontology, the elements ulti-
mately existing whereas the attā does not (Wynne 2010 p. 
159). This echoes the later dhamma theory in which form 
(rūpa) is further analysed in terms of the four primary 
elements (cattāri māha bhūtāni): the dhammas of solidity 
(earth), adhesion (water), heat (fire) and motion (wind) 
(Mendis, 1985 p. 23). These elements constituting the 
fundamental building blocks of material reality. The Sutta 
also accepts a variant of a realist semantics: 'the ultimate 
truth of things is here captured in words, and is not some-
thing beyond logic and the conceptual construction of 
consciousness' (Wynne, 2010 p. 159-160). Similarly the 
statement all phenomena are not Self (sabbe dhammā 
anattā ) found many places in the canon, such as in the 
Dhammaniyāma Sutta (PTS:A i 286), and the Ānanda 
Sutta (PTS:S iv 400) is most readily interpreted in line 
with the later dhamma theory of the Abhidhamma. Rahula 
notes that by the phrase 'all dhammas are not Self' the 
Buddha is explicitly claiming that the attā is nowhere to 
be found in reality (Rahula 1959, p.58) – a statement 
which seems to assume that there is a fixed external re-
ality which is ontologically composed of the dhammas 
but in which ultimately no attā is to be found. On the evi-
dence of the Vajirā Sutta we must accept that the reduc-
tionist realism of Buddhaghosa can be traced back to the 
early Suttas themselves – although this position may be 
explicitly stated rarely and may not be as fully developed 
as in the Abhidhamma Commentaries. This view of the 
self found in the Abhidhamma Commentaries shares a 
great deal of similarities with Western reductionist views 
of the self such as Parfit's. 
Like the Buddha Parfit is arguing against substantialist 
views of the self. In Western philosophy perhaps the most 
famous proponent of the substantialist view of the self is 
René Descartes. Descartes in his Book 6 of the Medita-
tions asserts that the mind and body are of different sub-
stances, because it is possible to imagine the existence of 
the mind without the body (Descartes, 2008 pp. 73-83). 
The essence of the human being is intellect and the mind 
is a purely thinking substance separate from the body. 
Hence the famous Cartesian slogan 'cogito ergo sum' (I 
think therefore I am) (Descartes, 2008 p. 13). Parfit 
claims that the notion of a Cartesian Ego is intelligible 
only if this Ego were to manifest itself empirically, but 
that no such Cartesian Ego is to be found upon empirical 
investigation (Parfit, 1984 p. 227). In addition Parfit ar-
gues that it is not intelligible to argue that Cartesian Egos 
exist but are not empirically observable (Parfit, 1984 p. 
228). 
This line of reasoning is similar in style to the reason-
ing of the Buddha in the Second Sermon (PTS: S iii 66). 
The Buddha asserts that if the Self (attā) existed it would 
be observable, yet upon examining the entirety of human 
experience through the schema of the five khandhas the 
Buddha demonstrates that no permanent blissful attā is to 
be found, rather all phenomena are impermanent (anicca) 
and unsatisfactory (dukkha). Furthermore it is unintelli-
gible to assert that the attā exists but is not connected 
with human experience in any way. This notion is ex-
pressed in the Mahānidāna Sutta here it is stated 'where 
nothing whatsoever is sensed (experienced) at all, would 
there be the thought, "I am"?' (PTS: D ii 55. Trans Tha-
nissaro, [2013]). This passage is interpreted by Harvey to 
be rejecting the possibility of a transcendent attā above 
and beyond the empirical experience of the five khand-
has. (Harvey, 1995, pp.31-33)  
According to the Abhidhamma Commentaries what 
the Buddha asserts does exist is a conventional self which 
is dependent upon and can be entirely reduced to the 
dhammas of the five khandhas. It is the dhammas which 
are, ontologically, ultimately real. What guarantees per-
sonal identity across time according to this view is that 
the khandhas of one conventional self at time x-1 stand in 
the appropriate causal relation to the khandhas of the 
same conventional self at time x. This continuity of karma 
is compared in the Milindapañha (3.2.6) to the fruit (in 
this case a mango) arising from the seed planted in the 
ground. Though the mango and the seed are not physi-
cally identical it is the case that, conventionally, they are 
the same mango because the fruit stands in the appropri-
ate causal relation to the seed. In the same manner the 
karmic seeds sown by one conventional self at time x-1 
produce causal conditions which produce the karmic fruit 
for the same conventional self at time x.  
Parfit also accepts the existence of a conventional self 
which ultimately can be reduced to a set of impersonal 
facts about the brain and body. He states 'though persons 
exist, we could give a complete description of reality 
without claiming that persons exist.' (Parfit 1984 p.212). 
This apparent paradox is resolved by appealing to the way 
we use language: 'facts about people cannot be barely 
true. Their truth must consist in the truth of facts about 
bodies, and about various interrelated mental and physical 
events ' (Parfit, 2011 p. 424). He illustrates this by means 
of example. Suppose I have detailed scientific informa-
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tion about a group of trees growing on a hill. I then learn 
the further piece of information that this group of trees 
can be referred to as a 'copse'. In this instance I have not 
learnt any new factual information about external reality 
but a fact about the way we use language. The case is 
similar for persons, all the non-linguistic facts about a 
person can be reduced to psychological and physical facts 
about the brain and body. The fact that we call this bundle 
of psychological and physical processes a 'person' is only 
a fact about language. (Parfit, 2011 p. 424). This resem-
bles the already quoted passage of Buddhaghosa: just as 
when the axles, wheels and frame are arranged in a cer-
tain way there is the linguistic convention to call this ag-
gregation a chariot, so too when there are the khandhas 
there is a person Visuddhimagga (XVIII, 28). Indeed Par-
fit makes expicit comparison of his view to that of the 
Buddha stating: 
 
'I claim that, when we ask what persons are... the fundamental 
question is a choice between two views. On one view, we are 
separately existing entities, distinct from our brain and bodies 
and our experiences.... The other view is the Reductionist View. 
And I claim that, of these, the second view is true. As Appendix 
J shows, Buddha would have agreed [emphasis in original]. 
The Reductionist View is not merely part of one cultural tradi-
tion. It may be, as I have claimed, the true view about all people 
at all times.' (Parfit, 1984 p. 273) 
 
Parfit goes on in Appendix J to quote among other texts 
the Visuddhimagga (XVIII 3 31): 'The mental and ma-
terial are really here, but here there is no human being to 
be found' (Parfit, 1984 pp. 502-3) and the chariot simile in 
the already quoted Vajirā Sutta. Thus stressing himself 
the similarities between Buddhist reductionism and his 
own position. 
Nevertheless the notion of karmic continuity is alien 
to much of Western philosophy and it is here that key dif-
ferences arise between the reductionism of Buddhaghosa 
and the reductionism of Parfit. For Parfit personal identity 
over time is established by the degree of psychological 
continuity between entities over time. Parfit terms the re-
lation of psychological continuity 'relation R'. Collins 
notes that in Buddhism by contrast relation R need not 
hold. Sentient beings may be reborn in a manner that is 
completely psychologically disconnected from their pre-
vious life. One who is reborn may (and frequently does 
according to the tradition) have no memories of their past 
life. In addition to this a being who was a human may be 
reborn as an animal with strikingly dissimilar cognitive 
capacities (for example a human and an ant) and hence 
any psychological continuity from one being to the next 
must be ruled out (Collins, 1997 p. 482). From this we 
may conclude that what matters in Buddhism is not Rela-
tion R, psychological continuity, but rather karmic conti-
nuity, what Collins terms Relation K (ibid.).  
It is the case that there are large similarities between 
the views of Parfit and Buddhaghosa and it can be said 
that both are reductionist realists about the self. Parfit 
claims that all facts about persons can be reduced to im-
personal psychological and physical facts about the 
world: 'the fact of a person's identity over time just con-
sists in the holding of certain more particular facts' (Parfit, 
1984 p. 210). This view accepts semantic realism – it ac-
cepts that there is a way 'ultimate reality' is structured and 
that language can refer to this reality with statements that 
are true or false. Similarly for Buddhaghosa ultimately 
reality is structured by the dhammas, those entities pos-
sessing svabhāva. As the dhammas can be described 
using language and sentences containing propositions 
about the dhammas will be true or false depending on 
how they relate to ultimate reality, the view of Buddhag-
hosa also accepts semantic realism. Similarly both Parfit 
and Buddhaghosa accept a conventional self. In both 
views a self is a conceptual fiction that is superimposed 
upon more basic elements of ultimate reality: for Parfit 
this reality is the processes of brain and body, for 
Buddhaghosa this ultimate reality is the khandhas. 
Nevertheless, as is to be expected, there are some key 
differences between the two views, for Buddhaghosa the 
criterion for determining personal identity over time is 
karmic continuity, whilst for Parfit it is relation R, psy-
chological continuity. As I have shown however the two 
views are close enough in character to warrant informa-
tive comparison and the reductionism of Parfit can be 
meaningfully used to elucidate the reductionism of 
Buddhaghosa. Finally, I have argued that the reductionist 
position of the Abidhamma Commentaries can be traced 
back to the Suttas themselves. This is particularly true of 
the Vajirā Sutta which is explicitly reductionist in con-
tent, using the well-known chariot metaphor which was 
later taken up by Buddhaghosa. On the evidence of this 
Sutta therefore it is possible to conclude that seeds of the 
fully developed reductionist position are already present 
in the Suttas and therefore that the Buddha was a reduc-





I have argued that it is correct to categorise the Buddha as 
a philosopher and that the Suttas contain elements of mo-
ral philosophy and what could be termed metaphysics. 
Explicitly metaphysical doctrines being those of depend-
ent origination ( paṭiccasamuppāda) and the five aggre-
gates (khandhas). I have asserted that the No-Self doc-
trine itself is a middle way (Majjhimāpaṭipadā) between 
the philosophical positions of eternalism (as found in the 
Upaniṣads) and annihilationism. I have raised the com-
mon objection that the Buddha shuns metaphysical specu-
lation as counterproductive as in the Cūḷamāluṅkyovada 
Sutta and have responded that the Buddha rejects disputa-
tion and contentiousness for its own sake but not philo-
sophical reasoning per se. I have explicitly argued against 
the views of Thanissaro (2011) who has put forward the 
position that the anattā doctrine is a purely practical strat-
egy with no metaphysical implications. In response to this 
position I have argued that the Buddha's silence in re-
sponse to certain metaphysical questions must be under-
stood in the context of the situation. In the Ānanda Sutta 
the Buddha refuses to answer Vacchagotta's question of 
'is there no self?' because a denial of the self here would 
be mistaken for annihilationism by the already bewildered 
Vacchagotta. Similarly the Buddha refuses to answer 
questions relating to the state of the Tathāgata after death 




ure. They assume the existence of a substantial entity de-
noted by the term Tathāgata and 'use personal referring 
terms, which according to Buddhist thinking have no real 
referent' (Collins 1982 p. 133). 
I then went on to discuss the views of Gombrich 
(2009), Ronkin (2005) and Ñāṇananda (1971). I noted 
that Gombrich (2009) holds that the Buddhist philosophy 
of language constitutes a rejection of Mī̄māṃsā. I dis-
cussed the notion of mental proliferation (papañca ) 
found in the Madhupiṇḍika Sutta and argued that this idea 
could be interpreted as pointing towards the inadequacy 
of conceptualisation ( saññā). Papañca for Ronkin points 
towards a rejection of semantic realism. For Ronkin 'The 
awakened mind breaks up the apparently solid world that 
we construct for ourselves' (Ronkin, 2005 p. 246) and 
realises that words and concepts do not name anything. I 
then explored the thesis that the rejection of papañca 
found in the Madhupiṇḍika Sutta anticipates the philoso-
phy of language of Nāgārjuna. Nāgārjuna asserts that the 
'characteristic of truth' (MMK 18.9) is free from mental 
proliferation (Skrt: prapañca Pāli: papañca) and Wester-
hoff (2017) interprets Nāgārjuna as rejecting a realist se-
mantics. As no entities possess svabhāva there is no way 
'things objectively are' hence language and truth are only 
conventions. I then argued that the views of Nāgārjuna 
can be traced back to the Suttas of the early Canon and 
that the seeds of the Madhyamaka emptiness doctrine and 
corresponding theory of language can be found in the Sut-
tas, particularly the Pheṇa Sutta and the Madhupiṇḍika 
Sutta. I concluded by demonstrating that whilst conven-
tionally Nāgārjuna is a reductionist he is ultimately not a 
reductionist about the self as he rejects semantic realism. 
Parfit states the definition of reductionism as such: all 
facts about a person can be reduced to a set of more par-
ticular impersonal facts (Parfit, 1984 p. 210). Whereas 
Nāgārjuna accepts a conventional self which is consti-
tuted by the five khandhas Nāgārjuna does not accept that 
there is ultimately a fixed structure to reality which can be 
described using language. Nāgārjuna therefore rejects the 
view that there is a set of 'more particular impersonal 
facts' that the conventional self can ultimately be reduced 
to. He does not assent to the existence of such facts and 
asserts in its place the view of emptiness. It is the case 
therefore that Nāgārjuna accepts the No-Self doctrine but 
rejects the reductionist No-Self doctrine of Buddhaghosa 
and Parfit at the level of ultimate truth. I concluded by 
arguing that if we are to follow Nāgārjuna's interpretation 
of the Buddha's teaching it would be legitimate to assert 
that the Buddha was not a reductionist about the self at 
the level of ultimate truth. 
I then examined the view of the self found in the Path 
of Purification (Visuddhimagga) of Buddhaghosa and the 
Abhidhamma Commentaries. I demonstrated that in the 
Commentaries there is an acceptance of a realist seman-
tics: The dhammas can be understood conceptually and 
can be described using language with sentences which are 
ultimately true or false. All facts about the self can be re-
duced to impersonal facts about the dhammas which are 
ultimately real and possess svabhāva. I then argued that 
this view is strikingly similar to that of Western reduc-
tionists such as Parfit. Just as for Parfit all the facts about 
a person can be reduced to psychological and physical 
facts about the brain and body so too for Buddhaghosa all 
conventional facts about the self can be reduced to deeper 
facts about the dhammas. In addition both Parfit and 
Buddhaghosa accept a conventional self based on how we 
use language. Whilst there are some differences between 
the two positions such as between karmic continuity and 
relation R the positions are fundamentally similar. I also 
argued that this reductionist realism can also be traced 
back to the Suttas particularly the Vajirā Sutta. 
Was then the Buddha a reductionist about the self? I 
have argued that seeds of both the reductionist realist po-
sition of Buddhaghosa and the semantic anti-realism of 
Nāgārjuna can be found in the early Suttas, specifically 
the Vajirā Sutta and the Madhupiṇḍika Sutta respectively. 
When taken in their fully developed form these ideas are 
in contradiction to one another, or as Nāgārjuna would 
assert, express different levels of truth. For Nāgārjuna re-
ductionism is true at the conventional level but ultimately 
there is only emptiness. For Buddhaghosa reductionism 
represents the way reality 'really is' and hence is an ulti-
mate truth. There is therefore a tension within the early 
tradition, there are seeds of certain ideas which when de-
veloped in certain ways yield mutually incompatible 
fruits. The Buddha of Buddhaghosa is a reductionist and a 
realist. The Buddha of Nāgārjuna ultimately rejects se-
mantic realism and refuses to speak of an 'objective re-
ality'. This former position would be recognisable to a 
Western reductionist about the self such as Parfit whereas 
the latter position would not. Both interpretations have 
textual support within the tradition and therefore it is pos-
sible to conclude that the Buddha of the Suttas was both a 
reductionist and not a reductionist about the self depend-
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